Euthyphro’s dilemma, first formulated by Plato in his dialogue Euthyphro, is a fundamental question in religious ethics and philosophy of religion. It essentially asks: Is something morally good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is morally good?
The dilemma arises from a tension between the divine command theory of morality, which states that morality is dependent on the commands of God, and the assumption that God is morally good. If something is morally good just because God commands it, then morality seems arbitrary – God could command murder to be good, and it would be. But if God only commands what is already morally good, then morality exists independently of God, challenging divine sovereignty.
Euthyphro’s dilemma is named after a character in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro. In the dialogue, Socrates asks Euthyphro, “Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (Plato, Euthyphro 10a) Socrates wants to know whether morality is dependent on the gods or exists independently of them.
The dilemma has implications for monotheistic religions like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam that emphasize both God’s sovereignty and God’s goodness. Defenders of the divine command theory have proposed various solutions, while critics argue the dilemma shows the inherent flaws in a God-based ethics.
There are several key points to understand about Euthyphro’s dilemma:
1. It questions the relationship between morality and God’s commands. Does God establish morality or merely recognize inherently good moral truths?
2. The “horns” of the dilemma are equally problematic for divine command theory: If God’s commands are arbitrary, morality seems subjective. If morality is objective, God seems unnecessary.
3. Plato raises this issue in the context of Greek polytheism and myths about the gods’ immoral behavior, but monotheists face a similar problem.
4. Defenders argue God’s nature is the standard of goodness, God necessarily commands what’s moral, or morality reflects God’s unchanging essence.
5. Critics (like atheist philosophers) argue it shows morality is independent of God and refutes divine command theory.
6. The dilemma has spawned considerable philosophical and theological debate. There is no consensus on the solution.
To fully grasp Euthyphro’s dilemma, it’s helpful to explore the background and context, the two “horns” of the dilemma, proposed solutions from defenders of divine command theory, and criticisms from skeptics.
Background and Context
In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro encounter each other at court while both facing criminal charges. Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for murder, while Socrates is being prosecuted for impiety. Socrates is puzzled that Euthyphro is sure he is doing the pious thing by prosecuting his father, so he asks Euthyphro to teach him the definition of piety or holiness.
After Euthyphro gives several unsatisfactory definitions, Socrates asks the famous question about whether the gods love something because it is holy, or whether something is holy because the gods love it. By this, Socrates intends to force Euthyphro into a dilemma: Either Euthyphro must admit there are moral truths beyond the gods’ commands, or he must say that any act (including murder or betrayal) could potentially be pious if a god commanded it.
The context here is important. In Greek mythology, the gods were not always portrayed as models of moral perfection. Stories abounded of their deceit, pettiness, and cruelty. Socrates references some of these, including the myth of Zeus binding his father Cronus for unjustly devouring his children. His point is that Euthyphro can’t definitively say the gods’ commands are always moral while admitting stories like this.
But Socrates’ question has force even when applied to a monotheistic God who is omnibenevolent. If morality is whatever God declares, then it seems no action, including charity or murder, is necessarily good or bad in itself – its morality depends wholly on God’s arbitrary choice. But this conflicts with our intuition that some acts are inherently wrong. Thus, even monotheists seem committed to moral truths beyond God’s commands.
The First Horn: Arbitrariness
The first horn of the dilemma is to say that God’s commands constitute morality. Whatever God commands is good by definition, and there are no moral facts beyond God’s commands. Nothing is intrinsically good or bad; it depends on what God decides.
This view leads to several troubling implications:
1. Morality becomes arbitrary – murder would be obligatory if God commanded it. Unusual commands in the Old Testament, like Abraham sacrificing Isaac, become morally mandatory.
2. God’s commands may not align with human intuitions about right and wrong, since there is no constraint besides God’s will.
3. God’s acts cannot be judged as good or evil independently since no moral standard exists apart from God’s own nature.
4. Calling God “good” becomes nonsensical if nothing is good except what God commands.
5. Morality is no longer objective or universal since it depends on the subjective whim of God, who could command radically different things.
So the first horn of the dilemma results in an understanding of morality that contrasts strongly with typical moral intuitions that certain acts are inherently evil. It is hard to deny that senseless murder, for example, feels objectively wrong. Thus, many find this “arbitrary morality” implication deeply problematic.
The Second Horn: Independence
The second horn of the dilemma is to say that some standard beyond God’s will sets moral truth. Certain acts possess intrinsic goodness or badness apart from what God decides. God merely recognizes these independent moral facts and commands accordingly. He cannot change fundamental morality; he is subject to it like anyone else.
This view avoids the problem of divine command theory leading to arbitrary or “absurd” moral conclusions. But it comes with its own set of objections:
1. Morality exists independently of God, implying God is not needed to ground or establish moral truths.
2. God’s own nature is subject to this external moral law rather than establishing it.
3. Morality remains the same regardless of God’s commands or even existence, contradicting divine command theory.
4. The standards God obeys seem to rival God in authority and necessity.
5. Calling God “good” becomes trivial if he merely follows impartial moral standards like anyone else.
Thus, the second horn preserves moral objectivity but raises questions about God’s role in the ethical framework. Saying morality originates outside of God conflicts with typical theistic claims that God is the foundation of morality and that moral duties flow from God’s commands. So both horns of the dilemma lead to counterintuitive conclusions.
Proposed Solutions
Throughout history, philosophers and theologians observing the Euthyphro dilemma have proposed various solutions that attempt to show morality is grounded in God’s commands while avoiding the implications of God commanding arbitrary acts. Some of the most notable attempts include:
1. Divine nature – God’s commands reflect his intrinsically good nature. Good flows from God’s character, not his will, so he only commands what is necessarily good.
2. Omnibenevolence – As a maximally good being, God necessarily commands only what is good. It is impossible for God to command murder or evil.
3. Divine reason – God has objective reasons for his commands based on rationally apprehending goodness. Morality is rational, not arbitrary, for God.
4. Divine simplicity – God’s commands, attributes, and essence are inseparably united. Referring to moral truth beyond God’s will is incoherent.
5. Divine freedom – God’s commands are free expressions of his moral nature. He necessarily wills what is good because he is good, not because he is subject to some external moral law.
6. Ethical non-naturalism – Moral facts exist as non-natural abstract properties that are necessarily exemplified in God’s nature.
7. Divine eternalism – God’s commands align with his timeless knowledge of morality, which he recognizes is unchanging. Temporal commands accord with eternal moral truth.
These diverse solutions aim to show that an omnibenevolent God will not command what is actually wrong or arbitrary. So divine command theory can avoid that troubling implication while still grounding morality in God’s intrinsic nature and will. However, critics argue these solutions either do not succeed or just obscure the real dilemma. The debate continues.
Criticisms of Divine Command Theory
Atheistic critics like J.L Mackie, Erik Wielenberg, and Wes Morriston argue that Euthyphro’s dilemma successfully refutes divine command metaethics and proves morality is independent from God. They contend:
1. Defining goodness based on God’s nature simply pushes the dilemma back a step. What determines God’s nature as good?
2. Saying God necessarily commands only what is good leaves open if those standards exist independently.
3. Divine reason, freedom, and omnibenevolence suggest God recognizes preexisting moral facts.
4. It is incoherent to speak of moral facts if everything, including morality, depends wholly on God.
5. Divine command theory reduces to moral subjectivism with God as the subject, risking moral absurdities.
6. Obeying moral laws to avoid punishment from a superior being is not true morality.
7. Actual scriptures and religious beliefs imply arbitrary divine commands influence morality.
These critics argue Euthyphro’s dilemma presents an insurmountable problem for the coherence and plausibility of divine command ethics. They contend it demonstrates morality does not depend on God’s commands and highlights problematic implications of submitting to a supreme commander rather than objective moral facts. They believe the dilemma stands as a powerful argument for secular ethics.
Conclusion
In summary, Euthyphro’s dilemma asks whether something is good because God commands it, or God commands it because it is good. The former suggests morality is arbitrary while the latter implies morality is independent of God. Defenders of divine command theory offer solutions that locate morality in God’s nature rather than will, but critics argue these solutions fail and the dilemma refutes divine command ethics. There is no consensus on this millennia-old question. Euthyphro’s dilemma remains a major philosophical problem for the relationship between God and morality.