The problem of evil is one of the most significant theological and philosophical challenges to Christian belief. Simply stated, the problem is that the existence of evil seems inconsistent with the existence of the all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God of the Bible. If God is all-powerful, He should be able to prevent evil. If God is all-knowing, He should foresee evil. If God is perfectly good, He should want to prevent evil. Yet evil exists. How can this be reconciled with belief in God?
In the late 20th century, Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga formulated an influential response known as the free will defense. Plantinga’s goal was to show that the existence of God and the existence of evil are logically consistent – that it is possible for both God and evil to exist. To do this, Plantinga argued that evil is not caused by God, but results from the misuse of free will by created beings. If God had created a world in which free creatures could never choose evil, then those creatures would not have true free will. According to Plantinga, true freedom is incompatible with external coercion or restriction. For human beings to be truly free, God must create them with freedom of choice, knowing that they may sometimes choose evil. But God also has morally sufficient reasons for allowing this freedom – reasons grounded in the great goods free will makes possible.
Let’s unpack the key components of Plantinga’s free will defense:
1. Free Will
Plantinga argues that free will is a great good, conferred on humans by God. To always choose good and avoid evil, humans would need to be determined or compelled by their nature to do so. But then they would lack free will in the most meaningful sense (Genesis 1:26-27, Joshua 24:15). True freedom requires the ability to choose between good and evil.
God could have created humans without free will, programming them to avoid evil. But forced or programmed obedience lacks moral worth. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church states, “Man’s freedom is real though limited” (para. 1739). Free will makes possible genuine love, virtue, moral character, and meaningful relationships between God and humans. Without freedom, we would be diminished persons (Deuteronomy 30:19).
2. The Necessity of Freedom for Love
Love and relationship with God must be freely chosen, not coerced. Forced love is a contradiction in terms. The highest forms of human achievement and fulfillment also require freedom. As Thomas Aquinas stated, “Man has free choice, otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain” (Summa Theologiae I, q. 83, a. 1).
Freedom is risky from God’s perspective. He desires that we freely choose to love and obey Him, but does not force us to do so (Joshua 24:15, John 3:16). True love involves vulnerability (1 John 4:8). From a human perspective, freedom provides dignity and responsibility (Genesis 1:27, Galatians 5:1).
3. Moral Evil Results from the Abuse of Freedom
Plantinga argues that moral evil (evil caused by free creatures) is the result of the misuse of free will. God is not directly responsible for moral evil, though He does permit it. Humans, possessing free will, are responsible for moral evil.
God could preemptively limit human freedom to prevent moral evil, but that would diminish human freedom and moral responsibility. God determines that creating a world with free creatures who sometimes choose evil is better than a world populated by determined, coerced creatures (Matthew 10:28, Romans 8:28).
4. Not All Evils Result from Free Will
Plantinga distinguishes between moral evil caused by free creatures and natural evil (evil not caused by moral agents, such as natural disasters, diseases, birth defects, etc.). While free will accounts for moral evil, Plantinga says natural evil may result from the free activity of non-human persons (demons, Satan) or because natural processes are not perfectly tuned in an evolving world order.
Ultimately, Plantinga says our limited human perspective prevents us from fully grasping God’s purposes in permitting natural evil (Isaiah 55:8-9). But we can trust God has reasons consistent with His perfect moral nature (Romans 8:28). Natural evil may lead to spiritual growth or be used by God in ways beyond our understanding (James 1:2-4).
5. Human Freedom Allows for Virtue and Redemption
For Plantinga, free will makes possible human redemption and atonement. Created good but fallible, man sinned by abusing his God-given freedom. But God graciously redeems humans through Christ’s sacrifice, rescued from sin by freely choosing to accept salvation (John 3:16-17, Ephesians 2:8).
Freedom also allows humans to develop virtue and moral character. Virtues like courage, justice, compassion and sacrifice cannot arise without freedom to overcome evil with good. Freedom provides the context for humans to freely love God and neighbor (Mark 12:30-31).
So in Plantinga’s view, God is justified in creating free creatures despite knowing they would sometimes misuse their freedom and sin. Forced virtue is no virtue at all. Freely chosen good is greater than compelled or programmed obedience.
6. Human Finitude and Fallenness
Ultimately, Plantinga says our limited human perspective prevents us from fully understanding an infinite God’s purposes. Due to human finitude, sinfulness and fallenness, we lack God’s omniscience to fully see how God uses freedom, evil and suffering to bring about greater goods (Isaiah 55:8-9).
But we can grasp in a limited, analogical way some of God’s reasons for permitting evil. We can also trust by faith that God uses evil to bring about good purposes, consistent with His perfectly good moral nature (Genesis 50:20, Romans 8:28).
7. Soul-Making Theodicy
Plantinga’s free will defense has similarities to John Hick’s “soul making” theodicy. Hick argues God permits evil and suffering to allow for human spiritual and moral development over time. Freedom and suffering shape human character and relationship with God.
For Hick, the Christian life is less about avoiding suffering and more about using suffering to become Christ-like. Suffering can elicit virtues like courage, compassion, patience and humility. God is less concerned with human happiness in this life than with eternal spiritual growth.
8. Objections and Responses
Critics raise metaphysical and evidential objections to Plantinga’s free will defense:
- God could have created a world with free will yet less evil (metaphysical objection)
- The amount of evil in the world seems excessive (evidential objection)
- Natural evils do not result from human free will
- The free will defense impugns God’s omnipotence
Defenders of Plantinga argue:
- We lack God’s omniscience to declare any possible world “better” than this one
- From a limited human perspective, evil may seem excessive
- Natural evils may have purposes unknown to finite humans
- God limits His power to make room for creaturely freedom
While objections remain, Plantinga showed logically that it is possible for God and evil to coexist. The existence of free will provides morally sufficient grounds for God to permit evil.
9. Conclusion
In summary, Plantinga’s free will defense argues that moral evil stems from humans misusing their divinely granted freedom. God permits moral evil because free will is a greater good than a coerced, robotic world devoid of love, virtue and meaning. While objections persist, Plantinga showed the existence of God and evil are logically compatible. Evil results when free creatures depart from God’s purposes. But in His sovereignty, God can ultimately use evil to bring about greater goods.